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Critics of the bomber offensive frequentlyargue that the materiel and human cost of
the campaign far overshadowed the gains, and
that the resources dedicated to it could have been
more effectively utilized elsewhere. They have
argued that the combat manpower could have
been better used in the other fighting services,
especially the army, and industry could have
been used to produce more weapons for these
fighting services. However, proponents of this line
of thought assume that the weight of effort
expended on the bombing campaign was
inordinately high. Richard Overy maintains that
it was actually rather modest. “Measured against
the totals for the entire war effort (production
and fighting), bombing absorbed 7 percent,
rising to 12 percent in 1944–45. Since at least a
proportion of bomber production went to other
theatres of war, the aggregate figures for the
direct bombing of Germany were certainly
smaller than this. Seven percent of Britain’s war
effort can hardly be regarded as an unreasonable
allocation of resources.”1  Further, although some
significant infantry shortages were experienced
in 1944, they never reached an extremely critical
overall level and were eventually rectified. With
respect to materiel, none of the services was
conspicuously wanting for anything by 1943, and
the British effort was thereafter bolstered by
substantial North American war production.
The Down Side
Much of the criticism of the bombingcampaign has focused on the human cost,
the unquestionably heavy loss rates endured by
Anglo-American aircrews, 81,000 of whom
forfeited their lives aboard 18,000 aircraft lost
from all causes.2 However, these losses need to
be placed in perspective, especially when
compared to the twenty- to twenty-seven million
war deaths suffered by the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, the human cost of the campaign
was formidable. During the entire period of the
Eighth Air Force’s operations over Europe, which
included Pointblank from 10 June 1943 until
April 1944, roughly 26,000 American airmen of
that numbered air force alone were killed, while
another 20,000 became prisoners of war.3
Bomber Command, in six years of war, lost
55,573 airmen, 47,268 on operations, and a
further 8,305 due to training, non-operational
flying accidents and other causes.4  Command
aircraft losses from all causes totaled 12,330,
of which 8,655 went down over Germany, Italy
and Occupied Europe.5
During the war, Bomber Command’s
125,000 airmen6 flew 364,514 sorties over
Europe,7  and the majority of the Command
tonnage was dropped from the summer of 1944
until the cessation of hostilities. To put the total
campaign in perspective, by VE-Day 955,044
tons of bombs had been dropped on Germany,
Italy, enemy occupied territory and targets at sea.
Approximately 74 percent of the total tonnage
was delivered after 1 January 1944, and 70
percent of the total after 1 July 1944, from which
time forward the Bomber Command loss rates
were greatly reduced.8 In round figures, 48,000
tons were dropped on European targets up until
the end of January 1942, an additional 42,000
tons by year’s end, another 158,000 tons in 1943
and the balance thereafter. Of the totals dropped
on the European Axis powers during the war,
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68.8 percent fell on the Reich itself, 30.19
percent on the enemy occupied territories, 0.94
percent on Italy and 0.07 percent on targets at
sea.9 “If the bombing of Germany had little effect
on production prior to July 1944, it is not only
because she had idle resources on which to draw,
but because the major weight of the air offensive
against her had not been brought to bear. After
the air war against Germany was launched on
its full scale, the effect was immediate.”10 Overall
loss rates for the entire war averaged 2.58
percent per raid, which, ironically, would almost
provide that “50-50 chance of survival” on which
the operational tour lengths were codified in
1943,11 but only for the first tour of operations.
It did not include the accidental fatal casualties,
6.64 percent of the wartime force, nor did it
include another 3 percent who were seriously
injured in these mishaps. Reduced to round
numbers for the entire duration of the war, of
every 100 airmen who joined Bomber Command,
38 were killed on operations, eight became
POWs, three were wounded, seven were killed
in operational accidents or in training, and three
were injured in training.12 Therefore, only 41 out
of 100 escaped unscathed from any of the
aforementioned categories, although not
necessarily unscathed by all manners of
measurement. Only the Kriegsmarine’s U-boat
arm suffered greater overall casualty percentages
on a sustained basis.13
As a subset of the larger picture, the
Canadian story is considerably more positive.
Of the 91,166 RCAF aircrew who commenced
training under the terms of the BCATP, 75,668
or 83 percent graduated in one of the aircrew
trades. Of this number, and factoring in a trained
surplus-to-needs of 10,500 Canadian aircrew
late in the war, approximately 50,000 RCAF
BCATP graduates eventually served overseas.14
Bomber Command was far and away the
majority employer of these graduates, and it is
estimated that approximately 40,000 RCAF
aircrew served either operationally or at an
operational training unit with the Command at
some time during the war.15
Here, one must note that both the total
number of Canadian aircrew in Bomber
Command service, as well as the total Canadian
aircrew casualty figures, are surprisingly difficult
to verify. In the absence of definitive overall
figures, I have taken the liberty of making some
reasonable assumptions, based on what is
known. As we have seen, there were essentially
three classes of Canadian aircrew in Bomber
Command service:
Canadians in indigenous RCAF Bomber
Command squadrons, or in 6 Group;
RCAF aircrew serving in RAF Bomber Command
squadrons; and
The CAN/RAF airmen, Canadians in the direct
employ of the RAF.
However, the undisputed total number of
RCAF aircrew fatalities in Bomber Command is
9,919 of the 40,000 who served, of which 8,240
(20.6 percent) were killed on operations. They
included RCAF members serving in 6 Group,
405 (Pathfinder) Squadron of 8 Group, and
The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP)  was one of the main sources of aircrew for Bomber Command.
Here, instructors at No.5 Elementary Flying Training School at High River, Alberta, pose for a photo, circa 1941.
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RCAF members serving with RAF bomber
squadrons. A further 673 (1.68 percent) were
wounded in action, and 1,647 (4.12 percent)
were killed in operational accidents or training.
Also, 1,849 (4.62 percent) would become
prisoners of war, while 659 (1.65 percent) were
injured in operational accidents or training.16
Compared to the overall war-long Bomber
Command casualty rate, only 32.67 percent17
(vice the 59 percent Command average) of all
RCAF Bomber Command aircrew became
statistical casualties, although this figure does
not include an estimated 737 of at least 1,106
CAN/RAF airmen, two-thirds of the total, who
are believed to have served with Bomber
Command in direct RAF service. Of the 1,106
total, at least 778 are known to have been killed
either operationally or accidentally,18 and
therefore a reasonable two-thirds extrapolation
suggests a further 519 CAN/RAF Bomber
Command fatal casualties can be added to the
RCAF total, and subtracted from the British total.
Similar cases can undoubtedly be made for other
non-Britons on direct service in RAF units.
Worthy of note, given the dynamic and wide-
ranging nature of Bomber Command’s war, many
of its casualties are simply categorized as
“Missing – presumed dead.”19 This is a poignant
testimonial to the violent nature of their passing.
For them, no burial plot or headstone was left
to comfort loved ones and to mark their place of
eternal rest. The skies over northwest Europe
remain their cemetery. The Runnymede
Memorial in Britain, dedicated in 1953, contains
the names of 20,000 Commonwealth airmen of
the Second World War who have no known
graves. Included among them are the names of
3,072 Canadians. Others are commemorated
and/or buried in locations as diverse as
Bournemouth and Berlin.20
There are a number of reasons for the
significantly lower RCAF casualty rates. Although
the CAN/RAF loss rate and that of RCAF aircrew
serving in RAF squadrons essentially mirrored
that of their British colleagues, Canadians were
not present in large percentages during the very
early days of Command operations when loss
rates were relatively high. Nor did some aircraft
fleets with the highest loss rates, such as the
Manchester and the Stirling, ever equip RCAF
bomber squadrons, although many Canadians
crewed both types.
The young faces of Bomber Command. This crew is representative of the multi-national nature of Bomber Command.
Back row (left to right): Pilot Officer M.F. Sanders (Australia); Flying Officer J.A. Anderson (Canada); Flight Sergeant
Skeeter (Australia); Front row: Flying Officer A.P. McKillop (Canada); Sergeant A.S. Kenyon (United Kingdom); Sergeant
F.W.J. Flippant (United Kingdom); Warrant Officer E.B Jolanson (Canada) and Sergeant M.A. Gerrard (United Kingdom).
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One should note that eleven RCAF Bomber
Command squadrons had been formed prior to
the official paper establishment of 6 Group in
October 1942. However, the last six of those units
were barely in existence prior to the group’s
official stand-up for operations in January
1943.21 In all, there were 4,203 known fatal 6
Group casualties during the 28 months of its
operations.22 If a Canadianization rate of 75
percent is applied to this number for the
duration of the group’s existence,23 an estimated
3,152 of 6 Group’s 4,203 fatalities were
Canadian. Subtracting this number and the
1,900 fatal RCAF Bomber Command casualties
prior to 1 January 1943 from the 9,919 total
wartime figure, it is estimated that 4,867 RCAF
aircrew in RAF bombing squadrons forfeited
their lives from 1 January 1943 until the
cessation of all hostilities in August 1945. In the
summer of 1944, there were approximately
10,200 RCAF aircrew in all RCAF squadrons
overseas, and 16,000 RCAF aircrew in all RAF
squadrons overseas.24 These numbers represent
38.5 percent and 61.5 percent respectively of
the totals of RCAF aircrew serving overseas, and
the Bomber Command subset of these numbers
would closely mirror this ratio. And the
Canadian 6 Group losses of 3,152 represent 39.2
percent of the known losses for the period,
whereas the estimated 4,867 RCAF aircrew
fatalities in RAF units during the time-frame
represent 60.8 percent of the estimated totals.
Again, these numbers are logical when spanning
a period when losses would be expected to be
relatively equal throughout the Command.
The lowest loss rate in Bomber Command
was 6 Group’s overall 2 percent per operation,
and this impressive statistic is yet another reason
why Canadian bomber casualties fell significantly
below the wartime Bomber Command average.
However, 6 Group was not yet in existence during
many of the darkest early days of the bombing
campaign. While it did stumble at the outset
relative to the performance of the other groups,
its initial high loss rates were somewhat
mitigated by the three Wellington squadrons
syphoned off as 331 Wing to support the Allied
landings in Sicily and Italy.25 However, there is
no doubt that the requirement to send
experienced crews in support of Operation Torch
degraded the overall experience level of the crews
available for 6 Group’s early operational
challenges and adversely affected the loss rates
for those then flying out of Yorkshire. Late in the
bombing campaign, during the last year, the
group’s performance was second-to-none. In fact,
its overall wartime loss rate of 1.8 percent for
Halifaxes and Lancasters combined was the best
in Bomber Command. These results are also a
resounding endorsement of the very high calibre
of leadership and the professionalism fostered
within 6 Group, particularly after it was placed
under the guidance of Air Vice-Marshal Clifford
M. “Black Mike” McEwen.
If one adds the estimated 519 Bomber
Command fatal CAN/RAF casualties to the
known 9,919 RCAF Bomber Command
casualties, a reasonable estimate of overall fatal
Canadian aircrew casualties during the
campaign would be 10,438 out of 40,737
participants,26 or roughly 25.6 percent of those
who served.
However, there were periods of time when
the odds against survival were particularly
daunting. For example, with respect to 6 Group’s
Air Vice-Marshal Clifford M. “Black Mike” McEwen
(standing right, under the nose of a Lancaster II) was the
outstanding commander of Bomber Command’s 6 Group
RCAF.
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Halifax II/V operations between March 1943 and
February 1944, the average monthly loss rate
was 6.05 percent per operation, producing a
mere 16 percent survival rate.27 Between August
1943 and March 1944, the group’s Lancaster II
loss rate averaged 5 percent per operation,
producing a concomitant 21 percent survival
rate.28 During the group’s first year of operations,
for those flying Wellingtons between January and
October 1943, the loss rate averaged 3.6 percent,
producing a survival rate of 34 percent.29 That
said, the February 1944 decision by Harris to
restrict the Merlin-powered Halifax II/V
squadrons from operations over Germany due
to service ceiling limitations during a period of
brisk operational tempo undoubtedly saved
Canadian lives. An earlier decision to relegate
Bomber Command Wellington squadrons to
mostly Gardening operations during the summer
and early autumn of 1943 similarly eased the
losses in that community.30
There is also no doubt that the particular
time at which aircrew members commenced
their operational tours significantly affected their
chances of survival. Given a period of intense
operational activity, it was not unusual for a crew
to complete an operational tour within three
calendar months, a common occurrence during
the last year of the war. However, if, for example,
those three months fell within the confines of
the Second Battle of the Ruhr from March to
July 1943, or the Berlin raids from November
1943 to March 1944, individual crew odds of
survival were much less than, for example, those
who commenced operations later in 1944. The
later rates graphically illustrate how enormous
the bombing weight of effort was during the final
nine months of the war under increasingly
favourable circumstances, and they somewhat
mitigate the dreadful earlier statistics.
Accomplishments of
the Bombing Campaign
So much for the losses…what of the gains?First, the gains were not only what was
directly attributable to the bombing, such as the
actual destruction of targets, but also constituted
a host of indirect benefits brought on as adjuncts
to the bombing. In Richard Overy’s words:
From Galbraith onwards the view has taken root
that the only thing that Bomber Command did,
or was ordered to do, was to attack German
cities with indifferent accuracy. The Bombing
Surveys devoted much of their effort to
measuring the direct physical damage to war
production through city bombing. This has
produced since the war a narrow economic
interpretation of the bombing offensive that
distorts both the purposes and nature of Britain’s
bombing effort to an extraordinary degree.31
While part of the bombing effort was to be
directed at Germany’s home front military and
economic structures if the nation first attacked
civilian targets in an indiscriminate manner, very
large portions of the overall effort were directed
at many other targets for which the Command’s
aircraft were needed. Again, as Overy mentions,
not even half the Command’s total wartime
dropped bomb tonnage was dedicated to the
industrial cities.32 Also, during the later stages
of the campaign, even attacks against
industrialized cities were frequently tactical
rather than strategic, conducted as they were in
support of the advancing Allied land armies. For
much of the first four years of the war, support
for the naval war comprised a significant portion
of the Command’s overall effort, while for much
of 1944, it was extensively used in support of
the invasion of northwest Europe. Additionally,
Command aircraft were used for reconnaissance,
for propaganda missions, for electronic warfare
and deception operations, for support to
Occupied Europe’s resistance movements, and,
as we have seen, for humanitarian aid and mercy
missions towards the end of hostilities. Bomber
Command was a true “Jack-of-all-trades,” and it
required the full resolution of its commanders
not to become excessively and repeatedly
diverted from its primary mandate by all the
competing demands on its limited resources.33
With the benefit of hindsight, while Arthur
Harris was undoubtedly correct in his
assessment of the need for a broad application
of area bombing during the early innings of the
campaign, his dogged rejection of the so-called
“panacea targets” later on appears to have been
somewhat myopic. Albert Speer and others
dreaded timely follow-on efforts to the highly
successful 1943 attacks on the Ruhr dams,
Hamburg,34 and the ball-bearing industry, and
they believed that such a concentration of effort
at the time would have been cataclysmic for the
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Reich. Similarly, an earlier and more dedicated
application of effort against the enemy’s oil
resources, which pitted the Commander-in-Chief
Bomber Command against the Chief of the Air
Staff, might have brought the European war to
an earlier conclusion. But such is the fog of war,
and Arthur Harris sincerely believed he was
following the correct course and was utilizing
his Command to inflict the most damage under
the circumstances presented to him. And the
course he chose, the targets he elected to pursue,
perhaps at the cost of others more viable, were
certainly not without merit or justification. Again,
the wisdom of hindsight needs to be tempered
with the perceptions of the day. Besides, Harris
was firmly convinced from an early stage of the
bombing campaign that frequent, concentrated
repeat visits to specific targets would bring
prohibitive losses to his Command.
The bombing offensive was also seen as a
way to avoid the carnage of trench warfare,
exemplified by the abattoir that the Western Front
had become during the Great War. “For Britain,
with its small population and the lack of a large
standing army, a small force of specialized
volunteers was arguably a more effective way of
mobilizing British manpower than the
development of a large and inexperienced ground
army.”35 Also, all the great early airpower
theorists of the pre-Second World War period,
including Guilio Douhet, William “Billy” Mitchell
and Sir Hugh Trenchard, had espoused the
primacy of offensive air operations, the relative
invulnerability of the bomber and the
comparative fragility of civilian morale. The
bomber offensive was very much in lockstep with
Britain’s overall peripheral strategy, which meant
a war of long-term economic attrition and
opportunism against the Germans, as opposed
to a directly confrontational war of mass and
concentration. The bomber offensive was, in fact,
the epitome of unconventional, guerrilla warfare,
and thus in keeping with Britain’s overall
strategic plan.
Furthermore, the Command made possible
a combat initiative that was deemed vital, not
just for the damage it would cause the Third
Reich, but for the galvanizing of both British and
global support. It certainly affected American and
Commonwealth opinion, as well as that of
potential allies and enslaved nations,
telegraphing British resolve to forcefully press
home the fight against the tyranny of Nazism,
alone if necessary. Its very prosecution assured
Britain a pivotal say in the conduct of the war. It
also did wonders for domestic morale, bolstering
the British public in a time of great need for
reassurance and hope. This evidence of
commitment was never more important than
after the German invasion of the Soviet Union
during the summer of 1941. The bombing
offensive constituted a second front, a significant
source of relief to the beleaguered Soviets when
no other offensive action was realistic or even
possible. Later, bombing’s contributions became
a prerequisite to the successful invasion of
northwest Europe; “an independent campaign
to pave the way for a combined arms invasion of
Hitler’s Europe.”36 From April until September
1944, the majority of Bomber Command’s
activities were conducted in lockstep with the
preparation, execution, and aftermath of the
invasion through Normandy. And in the wake of
this effort, the Command dealt decisive blows
to the enemy’s transportation and petroleum
resources, effectively paralyzing the Third Reich
in its final hours.
The total defeat of Germany’s air force,
through direct attacks on production facilities,
airfield and support installations on the ground,
and a highly successful war of attrition in the
air, was a pivotal contribution to winning the war.
Of the overall bombing offensive, Albert Speer,
Hitler’s Minister for Armaments and War
Production, said: “As far as I can judge from the
accounts I have read, no one has seen that this
was the greatest lost battle on the Germans’
side.”37
And what of the specific direct and indirect
effects of the bombing? The latter were in ways
much more damaging to the Axis war effort, and
while engineers speak of a Law of Unforeseen
Advantages, many of these indirect benefits were
anticipated, if not deliberately orchestrated. The
direct damage was also highly significant
however.
Once air superiority had been attained over
the Third Reich by the spring of 1944, the Allied
air forces exploited this turn of events in a series
of concentrated and systematic attacks against
the German synthetic oil industry and
transportation systems. The attacks on both
these resources contributed significantly to the
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final collapse of the Reich. For example, German
domestic oil production plummeted from
673,000 tons in January 1944 to 265,000 tons
in September, and aviation fuel was temporarily
reduced to 5 percent of needs.38 Since nothing
was more germane to the collapse of the German
armed forces than the irrevocable defeat of its
airpower, the effective grounding of the Luftwaffe
was a knockout punch. The campaign against
the synthetic petroleum plants, the refineries,
and the oil fields was the most effective means
of rendering the Luftwaffe impotent. The overall
shortage of aviation gasoline adversely affected
flying training from as early as 1942, with a
concomitant serious degradation in the quality
of personnel. The specific output of aviation fuel
actually fell from 195,000 tons in May 1944, to
35,000 tons by mid-summer, and to a paltry
7,000 tons by September. Although stockpiled
resources kept the Luftwaffe flying after a fashion
throughout the summer, by autumn, shortages
were acute. This had to be a bitter irony for
Germany’s air leaders, for it came at a time when
the air industries achieved a new peak in fighter
production, completing 3,133 aircraft in
September alone. Along with making this
production increase in conventional-type aircraft
of little military significance, the additional
limited availability of low-grade fuels, which
could only be used in high-performance turbojet
aircraft, was one reason that a jet force could
not be fielded in time to become a significant,
widespread threat to the Allies. As a broader,
over-arching result, the Eighth, Ninth and
Fifteenth Air Forces, working in concert with
Bomber Command, destroyed virtually all of
Germany’s coke, ferroalloy and synthetic rubber
industries, 95 percent of its fuel, hard coal and
rubber capacity, 90 percent of its steel capacity,
75 percent of its truck producing capacity and
70 percent of its tire production.39 And while
various contemporary sources, including
German accounts, state that Bomber
Command’s area bombing contributed between
20 percent and 31 percent of the direct aircraft
production losses, and between 35 percent40 and
55 percent41 of armoured vehicle production
losses, many more losses were incurred while
the Germans were attempting to distribute the
finished products under near-continuous heavy
air attacks. At any rate, the point is moot.
Without fuel to convey the aircraft aloft or to get
the tanks into battle, they were useless.42
The loss of oil production was also felt in many
other ways. In August 1944, the final run-in time
for aircraft engines was cut from 2 hours to a
half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training,
previously cut down, was further curtailed.
Through the summer, the movement of German
Panzer divisions in the field was hampered more
and more seriously as a result of losses in
combat and mounting transportation difficulties,
together with the fall in fuel production. By
December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage
had reached catastrophic proportions. When the
Germans launched their desperate
counteroffensive on December 16, 1944, their
reserves of fuel were far from sufficient to
support the operation. They counted on
capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many
Panzer units were lost when they ran out of
gasoline.43
At this juncture of the war, Arthur Harris
may have exercised faulty judgement in not
mounting a more enthusiastic and focused
campaign against the oil resources, since he still
put considerable emphasis on the bombing of
the industrial cities. The counter-oil campaign
was decisive, though arguably prolonged by a
Two views of the Vickers Wellington: Right – a 419
Squadron Wellington in flight; Left – the crew of a
Canadian Wellington prepare for a mission in early
1945.
Left:CFJIC PC 2473; Below: Photo courtesy of David L. Bashow
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concentration on other interests. However, a
number of industrial cities hit by Bomber
Command during this phase included significant
damage to oil and related targets. The results
were on occasion significantly more successful
than the USAAF’s daylight bombing, thanks to a
high degree of experience and accuracy with the
blind-bombing aids Oboe and H2S, the Air
Position Indicator (API), the Group Position
Indicator (GPI) and the improved Mark XIV gyro
stabilized automatic bombsight (SABS). The
blow dealt was decisive; it just may have taken
longer to deliver because of the conflicting
priorities. Albert Speer concedes:
The systematic air raids of the fall of 1944 once
again throttled traffic and made transportation,
this time for good, the greatest bottleneck in our
war economy.44
Prior to the war, Germany possessed a world-
class railway system that was very capable and
well maintained, and it was complemented by
an equally formidable inland waterway system
for the movement of bulk material to and from
the industrialized Ruhr. However, the railroad
system became increasingly overburdened
through the industrial dispersion necessitated
by the bombing, and this dispersion required
the construction of considerably more railroad
infrastructure, which was highly susceptible to
concentrated air attacks. While the German
transportation system did not become a priority
target until very late in the war, “the effects of
the heavy air attacks beginning in September of
1944 were felt at once and were clearly apparent
in the general traffic and operating statistics of
the Reichsbahn…the heavy attacks of September
and October produced a most serious disruption
in railway operations over the whole of western
Germany.”45 Concurrently, successful attacks on
waterway targets devastated industrial traffic on
the Rhine and the north German canals, causing
the vital Ruhr district to suffer heavy declines in
transport. For example, the Dortmund-Ems
Canal, from October 1944 until March 1945,
could average only 12 percent of the shipping
attained during the previous year.46 The supply
of critical components to virtually all vital war
production elements was severely impacted by
the concentrated attacks of September and
October, and reserves were virtually exhausted
by November and early December. Most dramatic
was the near-total curtailment of hard coal
supplies to the Ruhr. “The consequences of the
breakdown in the transportation system were
probably greater than any other single factor in
Air attacks had a devastating impact on the transportation system throughout Germany and occupied
Europe. This photo shows the results of a bombing raid on the railway marshalling yards in Mezidon, France.
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the final collapse of the German economy…most
of the chaos which gripped the German economy
was traceable directly or indirectly to the disaster
which overtook the transportation system.”47 The
loss of transportation infrastructure stymied the
flow of basic raw materials, components and
semi-finished products, and also severely limited
the distribution of finished products.
It is true that large-scale priority attacks on
the transportation system came too late in the
war to seriously affect the German armed forces
at the fighting fronts. “By the end of the war,
however, it had so paralyzed the German
industrial economy as to render all further war
production virtually impossible. It had,
moreover, removed the foundation of the civilian
economy, suggesting the inevitability of eventual
collapse under continued air attack.”48
The Indirect Effects of
the Bombing Campaign
Throughout Germany in 1944 alone,approximately 800,000 workers were
engaged in essential repair work solely
attributable to the bombing, especially to
factories and to modes of communication. An
additional 250,000 to 400,000 personnel were
required to provide the necessary equipment,
resources, and services to effect the repairs.
Thus, a tremendous amount of the available
manpower was diverted from other essential
employment to the reconstruction effort.49
Furthermore, industrial reconstruction itself was
often subjected to push-pull meddling from the
highest levels, breeding further manpower
wastage. Albert Speer noted that Hitler himself
was very shaken by the destruction of valuable
historic buildings, particularly theatres.
“Consequently, he was likely to demand that
burned-out theaters be rebuilt immediately.
Several times I tried to remind him of other
strains on the construction industry.”50
The bombing of the industrial cities forced
a policy of decentralized production, or
dispersal, and this placed additional burdens
and vulnerability on the transportation and
communication networks. As well, it diverted
resources from new construction efforts.
Dispersal was highly disruptive to industrial
firms that had been centralized to operate at
maximum efficiency. Dispersal also demanded
a greater diffusion of and reliance on a very
limited pool of skilled labour, and led to a sharp
decline in the quality of weapons produced.
Supervisory shortages also resulted in
significantly more industrial sabotage from an
increasingly unwilling, press-ganged and slave
labour force. Decentralization denied the
Germans the ability to operate a rational,
efficient, highly centralized industrial war effort,
which would have permitted much higher levels
of output.51 In the aircraft industry alone:
Existing production schedules were disrupted
and dilution of management supervision made
itself felt. In the end, it increased the load on its
overburdened transportation system and, when
attack was concentrated on transportation, the
final assembly plants lacked the necessary sub-
assemblies and components. The policy of
dispersal was then revised in favour of
concentration underground, but it was too late.52
The frenzied production pace, aided by the
bombing, led to significant decreases in quality
control and greatly reduced worker productivity.
Shortages of skilled labour and strategic
materials, production interruptions, plant
damage, slipshod construction, and even
sabotage all led to declines in end-product
quality. Nowhere was this more evident than in
the aircraft engine industry, where the
increasingly unreliable powerplants generated
major problems in morale for the Luftwaffe,
especially among the inexperienced fighter pilot
cadre.
Yet the night bombing campaign’s greatest
contribution to the winning of the war was
precisely what Harris claimed and the
conventional wisdom has so often discounted.
The “area” bombing attacks did have a direct
and palpable effect on the morale of the German
population, and the German leadership, in
response to that impact, seriously skewed
Germany’s strategy. Recent scholarship in the
Federal Republic indicates that as early as the
summer of 1942, the night bombing campaign
was affecting German attitudes. In 1943, the
heavy bombing caused a dramatic fall off in
popular morale.53
As the foregoing words of American military
historian Williamson Murray attest, the
bombing’s impact on enemy morale was
significant. However, it was unrealistic to expect
that in an extreme police state such as the Third
Reich, a popular uprising and overthrow of the
Pg043-070 11/9/06, 2:56 PM51
9
Bashow: The Balance Sheet
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006
52
Nazi regime would ensue. Still, the cumulative
effects of the bombing, especially the bombing
by night, were intensely demoralizing. And once
the Allies had designated the ruin of enemy
morale, particularly that of the industrial work
force, as an overt war aim, regular intelligence
reports reinforced the views of senior Allied
commanders that this war aim was being
fulfilled. In fact, as early as the summer of 1940,
British intelligence sources in neutral
Switzerland reported the impact of the still-
minimal bombing on enemy morale as follows:
“A Swiss recently returned from Germany states
there is some labour unrest in the Ruhr owing
to the fact that workers are doing 12 hour shifts
a day and fail to get a proper night’s rest owing
to aerial attacks.”54
One of the most effective of an early series of
Bomber Command raids, and one frequently
underestimated in significance, was the bombing
of Berlin on the night of 4/5 September 1940.
While the damage was not extensive, the raids
generated considerable public resentment. Adolf
Hitler was goaded into switching his bombing
priorities to a retaliatory campaign against
London, just when the campaign against Fighter
Command’s airfields and command and control
facilities was proving decisive. There is little
doubt that this emotional decision by Hitler, soon
echoed by Göring, ensured the survival of both
Fighter Command and the British nation at their
moment of greatest vulnerability. Furthermore,
the following previously classified high-level
British and Allied documents from 1942 provide
substantiating evidence for continuing the
bombing campaign against enemy morale. These
observations were undoubtedly contributing
factors in the evolution of the bombing policy. A
letter from Paymaster General Lord Cherwell to
Prime Minister Churchill of 30 March 1942
states:
Investigation seems to show that having one’s
house demolished is most damaging to morale.
People seem to mind it more than having their
friends or relatives killed.55
Similar sentiments are expressed in these
excerpts from Mr. Justice John E. Singleton’s
“Report to the War Cabinet on the Bombing of
Germany,” dated 20 May 1942:
Another feature to which reference should be
made is the recent German propaganda, which
appears to show the anxiety felt in Germany on
our air raids on that country…Now we expect to
be able to deliver to Germany in the future a
much greater weight of bombs than we received.
If we can combine with this a greater measure
of accuracy and intensified concentration, I feel
it will have a very considerable effect, growing
as the intensity of the bombing increases, and
the more so if there does not appear to the
German people any likelihood of their air force
being able to deal with the forces of those
opposed to them.…Its effect on the German
people will be much greater if the projected
attack on Russia fails…It is right to say that
among the things which are important from the
point of view of morale of the people are housing,
warmth, sleep and food…The first sign of the
effect (of sustained bombing) may well appear
in the German troops if they realize that those
they have left at home cannot be protected from
air attack, as was promised to them…I think
there is every reason to hope for good results
from a sustained bombing policy.56
And a missive a month later, on 22 June,
from the US Consul General in Geneva through
Bern to the US Secretary of State elaborates:
There is reason to believe that high German
military circles are fearful of the effect of a mass
bombing designed to panic the civilian
inhabitants of thickly populated districts into
frenzied activity.57
The highly influential intelligence reports of
late 1942 also appeared to validate the area
bombing strategy against the industrial cities,
just prior to the pivotal policy decisions that
would be made at Casablanca early the following
year. British Intelligence Report No.346, 22
September 1942 notes:
Unrest; Stories Spread by Evacuees
Unrest in the bombed areas is great and in those
districts to which the homeless and children
from “air threatened regions” have been
evacuated, a certain nervousness is already
noticeable, because the evacuees naturally talk
about their experiences.
Destruction of Factories and Food Depots
These big raids cause much destruction. In spite
of the statements in the Wehrmacht reports, the
destruction of war production facilities is fairly
considerable. The loss caused by the destruction
of food stores and depots is extraordinarily great,
as the food cannot be replaced.58
The following is a British Intelligence “Report
on Bombing’s Effect on Housing and Division of
Effort,” from autumn 1942:
Pg043-070 11/9/06, 2:56 PM52
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss3/4
53
The loss of one’s home and possessions has been
found in this country (Germany) to be one of
the most important points with regard to morale.
Judging by the strict measures enforced on
information of the results of our raids reaching
the soldiers at the front, it would appear that
the German authorities are aware of the effect it
may also produce on the morale of the fighting
services.59
And finally an excerpt from “An Estimate of
the Effects of an Anglo-American Offensive
Against Germany by the Chiefs of Staff
Committee for the War Cabinet, 3 November
1942.”
Conditions at Karlsruhe, as compared with
Coventry and Lübeck, thus afford a striking
illustration of the cumulative effects on
organization and morale which have followed
raiding, even on the relatively small scale we have
achieved in the past few months. The change in
outlook which has taken place is perhaps best
shown by the pronouncements of Robert Wagner,
the local Gauleiter. These emphasize that during
air raids the individual must look after himself
as best he can, and after that he must be
prepared to do his own repairs without calling
on the authorities to help him. Such instructions
would be at least tolerable under a democratic
system which expects the citizen in emergency
to be capable of personal effort and initiative.
They accord very badly with the accepted
principles of Nazi centralized Government, and
the admitted breakdown at this early stage of
the State organization in which the Germans
have been so carefully taught to place implicit
faith is a significant indication of the effects which
large-scale bombing may be expected to
produce.60
The foregoing reports bolstered the wartime
belief of the Allied commanders that the bombing
campaign against enemy morale was viable and
worthwhile. Therefore, although specific
industrial and military targets were pin-pointed,
it was broadly anticipated that not merely
industrial materiel damage would occur,
particularly because of the German propensity
for embedding industrial facilities in residential
areas. As historian Denis Richards has written:
“With their homes, work places and
neighbourhood amenities all destroyed, on top
of all the privations they were thought to be
suffering, the German people were expected to
lose all their zeal, not only for production, but
also for the Nazi regime.”61
 The Moral Issue
However, it must be clearly understood thatno part of this policy deliberately mandated
the slaughter of civilians, although heavy civilian
casualties would be an inevitable result. Rather,
the intention was to make it exceptionally
difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy civilian
work force to remain on the job. “It was hoped
to break their will to do so by destroying their
houses and all the comforts and necessities of a
civilized urban life. If the civilians fled to the
countryside, or the authorities managed to
evacuate them from the major towns—as British
mothers and children had been evacuated during
the early days of the war—so much the better:
the industrial desert (the primary goal) could
be created with less loss of life.”62
However, after the Battle of Britain,
throughout that joyless winter of 1940–1941, the
Germans adopted a broader night bombing
campaign against the British industrial centres
as a means of weakening resistance and
disrupting the production and supply of war
materials. In addition to London, Liverpool, Hull,
Portsmouth, Coventry, and many other cities,
including the east coast ports, were singled out
for special attention, culminating in the Baedeker
Raids of early 1942. From this point onwards,
British authority no longer felt obliged to exercise
due care and restraint with respect to minimizing
collateral civilian casualties in the German
industrial centres. Furthermore, this policy
direction enjoyed widespread public support at
the time.
Richard Overy believes the Allied bombing
was severely disruptive to German society.
Throughout the war, nearly nine million citizens
were evacuated from the German cities, which
not only dramatically reduced the potential work
force, but also placed incredible strains on
infrastructure to provide shelter, nourishment,
and other essential consumer goods to all those
displaced persons, further diverting resources
from the war industries. Worker efficiency in
areas directly threatened by the bombing
suffered considerably; long, exhausting hours
were spent in cramped air raid shelters or
cellars. Absenteeism increased, and by 1944, it
averaged almost four full working weeks per
worker annually in the Reich. For example, at
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the Ford works in Cologne on any given day in
1944, at least one-quarter of the work force was
absent. When the numbers documenting the
unparalleled levels of productivity of German
industry during 1944 are examined, one has to
wonder what they would have been had the
Germans not been faced with a near-constant
threat of death from the air. Much of the
production was generated by slave labourers who
worked in atrocious conditions. This work force
was never more than two-thirds as productive
as free German workers, nor were they motivated
to improvement beyond the spur of terror. Along
with vast suffering, the bombing placed a definite
ceiling on German productivity, even in a state
of total war.
A significant amount of the increased late
war industrial output is explained by the fact
that Germany was deliberately working nowhere
close to full war capacity for the first three years
of the Second World War. When Albert Speer took
the helm as Armaments and War Production
Minister in February 1942, the nation was only
producing three percent more of these products
than in peacetime, and Adolf Hitler was adamant
that the military endeavours of the Third Reich
would not interfere with the consumer
industries. Hitler expected a Blitzkrieg win in
the Soviet Union, and he launched this precursor
to what would eventually become total war on
the foundation of a peacetime economic and
industrial output. Until 1943, German industry
was generally only working one ten-hour shift
each day. Thereafter, policy changed to
accommodate three shifts and a seven-day,
twenty-four-hour operation, augmented by an
involuntary work force of 2,500,000 prisoners
and 1,500,000 workers press-ganged in from the
occupied territories.63
As the bombing intensified, there were
profound political ramifications to Speer’s
industrial policies. Hitler and his entourage lost
confidence in Speer and began to blame him for
all the nation’s economic ills. Himmler became
increasingly involved in economic matters and
began running Speer’s system at gunpoint, which
in turn dissuaded many Germans.64
Bombing appreciably affected the German will
to resist. Its main psychological effects were
defeatism, fear, hopelessness, fatalism and
apathy. It did little to stiffen resistance through
the arousing of aggressive emotions of hate and
anger. War weariness, willingness to surrender,
loss of hope in a German victory, distrust of
leaders, feelings of disunity, and demoralizing
fear were all more common among bombed than
among un-bombed people…The disruption of
public utilities in a community did much to lower
the will to resist. Especially significant was the
disruption of transportation service; it was the
most critical public utility for the morale of the
civilian population. Electricity was next in
importance among the utilities, then water, then
gas. A vital blow to the morale of a bombed
community was the destruction of school and
recreational facilities for children. This
necessitated the evacuation of school children.
Parents were doubly affected by such evacuation
because they suffered not only the burden of
family separation but also the possible loss of
the moral guidance of their children to the Nazi
Party.65
The Effect on German Morale
The highest German authorities were veryconcerned with home front morale
throughout the bombing campaign. Albert Speer
paraphrased Hitler on 8 March 1943 as follows:
“Hitler repeatedly explained that if the bombings
went on, not only would the cities be destroyed,
but the morale of the people would crack
irreparably.”66 To maintain a feel for the pulse of
the nation’s morale, German authorities fielded
an extensive intelligence service, and the Official
Morale Reports this service provided
demonstrate that “in official German eyes the
air war was of crucial importance in the struggle
for popular support of the Nazi regime…These
accounts consistently assert that air attacks were
undermining morale and producing defeatism.”67
Propaganda, a keystone of the Third Reich,
was used as a means of stimulating morale and
it permeated everything in German day-to-day
life. However, “bombing had much to do with
the final discrediting of propaganda, because it
brought home to millions of Germans the
tangible proof of Allied air power—indisputable
proof completely at odds with the familiar Nazi
propaganda.” Surveys done after the war indicate
that only 21 percent of the Reich’s citizens
regarded German information provided during
the war as reliable, while 54 percent regarded it
as being “completely unreliable.”68
It is perhaps appropriate that Germany’s
pre-eminent conjuror of public opinion, Joseph
Goebbels, should have the final word on the
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impact of the bombing on German morale. These
brief excerpts from his “twelfth-hour” personal
diaries belie the public vitriolic pronouncements
on the bombing woven throughout the war by
the German Propaganda Ministry:
12 March 1945
The air terror which wages uninterruptedly over
German home territories make people
thoroughly despondent. One feels so impotent
against it that no-one can now see a way out of
the dilemma. The total paralysis of transport in
West Germany also contributes to the mood of
increasing pessimism among the German
people.
15 March 1945
Not only our military reverses but also the severe
drop in the German people’s morale, neither of
which can now be overlooked, are primarily due
to the unrestricted enemy air superiority.
31 March 1945
The political attitude of the people west of the
Rhine was very bad. They had been demoralized
by the continuous enemy air raids and are now
throwing themselves into the arms of the Anglo-
Americans, in some cases enthusiastically, in
others at least without genuine resistance.69
This lack of resistance in the German urban
areas at the end of hostilities undoubtedly
hastened the German surrender, and, based on
previous experiences, saved many late-war
casualties on both sides by avoiding difficult and
bitter house-to-house fighting.
A real importance of the air war consisted in the
fact that it opened a Second Front long before
the invasion of Europe. That front was the skies
over Germany. The unpredictability of the
attacks made the front gigantic. Every square
metre of territory we controlled was a kind of
front line and because the attacks were both by
day and night, it required a 24 hour state of
continuous readiness.70
In recent years, a number of eminent German
historians and political scientists have reversed
a widespread and popular German stance that
the area bombing was ineffective. Horst Boog,
who was until relatively recently Chief Historian
of the German Office of Military History, spoke
at a Symposium on the Strategic Bomber
Offensive, held at the RAF Staff College at
Bracknell in the United Kingdom in March 1993,
and undertook to dispel two persistent myths
concerning area bombing and German civilian
morale:
He said: “Let me give you some recent views
about the…bombing. The judgement that the
British area attacks were ineffective can no
longer be supported. For a proper assessment
we have to look at indirect effects. Had there
been no bomber offensive things in Russia might
have developed differently.” He also notes that
over a million men were now on the AA guns.
They would have served their country’s war effort
better in Russia, or in factories. Doctor Boog
also dispels the myth of continued high morale
under bombing. He defines morale as, “The will
to continue to work for the war effort.” But he
makes the point that the people were prisoners
of the Nazi regime. “Their political surveillance
system meant doing what one was told and not
shirking in the presence of others…morale was
certainly weakened, as recent studies have
revealed, and especially in cities suffering heavy
attacks.”71
The de Havilland Mosquito was a very capable and flexible aircraft which contributed to a rich and
varied operational life. Here, a bomber variant of the Mosquito is serviced prior to its next mission.
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German historian Götz Bergander has drawn
a significant distinction between private morale
and war morale in the Third Reich. Bergander
maintains the former was never broken, because
this constituted the will to live, “based on
personal, family and vocational aspirations and
generating inventiveness, stubbornness and the
desire to assert oneself. The latter, reflected in
people’s ability to think about future prospects,
was on the other hand severely damaged—much
more than first thought.”72
In reality, the air raids on cities and industry
shook the foundations of the war morale of the
German people. They permanently shattered
their nerves, undermined their health and shook
their belief in victory, thus altering their
consciousness. They spread fear, dismay and
hopelessness. This was an important and
intentional result of the strategic air war, of this
warfare revolution.73
Forced Diversions of Enemy
Economic Effort
Very little credit has been given for the copiousamounts of personnel and equipment that
remained tied down in Germany in defence of
the industrial cities, nor to those personnel
required to repair the damage done by the
bombing. Speer acknowledges that many new
and promising battlefield technological
improvements had to be shelved in order to
produce additional anti-aircraft weaponry, and
that half of the electronics industry was engaged
in producing radar and communications
equipment for the defence of the Reich. A third
of the precision optics industry was required to
produce gun sights for the flak batteries, which
frequently left German field forces critically short
of their own optical needs.74 Reichsmarschall
Hermann Göring positioned nearly 9,000 of the
formidable and versatile 88 mm flak guns within
the Fatherland, guns and operators which could
have doubled the German defences against
Soviet tanks on the Ostfront. By 1944, there were
14,489 heavy flak guns deployed in the west,
while a further 41,937 light guns were similarly
deployed to augment the heavier weapons.75 Anti-
aircraft shells consumed one-fifth of all
ammunition produced. Feldmarschall Erhard
Milch, the Quartermaster-General of the
Luftwaffe, said that within the Reich, nearly
900,000 men, along with some women and
Consolidated B-24 Liberators of the US 8th Air Force attack a target on the French coast during the Normandy campaign.
Sky markers (irregular smoke patterns visible at the bottom of the photo) provide an aiming point for the bombardiers
above a target covered in cloud.
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children, were employed in the anti-aircraft
forces alone by 1944.76 In aircraft operations,
from September 1942 until January 1943, the
Luftwaffe was tasked to keep the beleaguered
German garrison at Stalingrad supplied and to
provide combat air support against a tightening
Soviet noose. However, the need to honour the
bomber offensive in the West, along with other
Luftwaffe commitments and the renaissance of
the Soviet Air Forces made this an impossible
task. The resultant loss of the entire German
6th Army in February 1943 was therefore at least
partially attributable to Bomber Command’s
efforts to that point of the war. By January 1944,
68 percent of the day and night fighter forces
were dedicated to facing the Anglo-American
bomber threat, leaving only 17 percent of these
forces for the Eastern Front after other needs
were accommodated. By October 1944, the
percentage of fighter aircraft retained in the Reich
would balloon to 81 percent.77
These formidable apportionments slowly but
inexorably starved the German field armies of
essential air support. By 1944, German bomber
aircraft accounted for only one-fifth of all aircraft
production, because of the overriding need for
fighters at that stage of the war.78 Thus, without
the Allied bombing, German forces at the fighting
fronts would have had much greater aerial
support and protection, and Allied forces on all
fronts would have been much more exposed to
German aerial bombardment.
A significant number of unpredictable
diversions of effort were produced by the
bombing, although German war policy itself is
as much to blame for the ultimate success of
the bomber offensive. When Generaloberst
Wever, the Luftwaffe’s first Chief of Staff, died
in 1936, Germany lost its most fervent advocate
of the need for its own long-range strategic
bomber fleet. Instead, the country geared its
bomber production to medium and short-range
types to be used in conjunction with land forces
employing dynamic, short-term Blitzkrieg
tactics. A truly strategic, independent bombing
force would have made all the industrial targets
within the United Kingdom accessible by air, as
well as the vulnerable Soviet power stations and
industrial complexes, the majority of which had
been relocated to the east of the Ural Mountains
by 1943. It would also have posed a significant
long-range threat to Allied shipping convoys in
the North Atlantic. However, lack of extended
planning, underestimation of enemy capabilities,
and conflicting war priorities brought about by
different needs for different war theatres all
played a part in delaying the development and
production of a viable long-range strategic
bomber until Allied bombing had forced fighter
priorities on German aircraft production.
Bureaucratic ineptitude, high-level bickering,
sycophantic pandering to the frequently
contradictory, meddlesome, unrealistic, and
inappropriate war guidance of Adolf Hitler
himself, as well as an extreme shortage of
strategic materials, stymied this direction of
effort.
From 1944 onwards, Germany was devoting
the bulk of its aircraft production to day and
night fighters, largely of obsolete models and
technologies, for the defence of the Reich. The
strategic and administrative decisions that were
made in 1940 and 1941, and even earlier, with
respect to bomber fleets and air tactics effectively
sealed Germany’s fate and guaranteed a
permanent air inferiority for the rest of the
Second World War. German air strategy, rather
than being proactive and unpredictable, became
reactive and almost totally predictable, in no
small measure because of the Allied bombing.79
Approximately 70,00080 aircrew members of
the Luftwaffe were either killed or reported
missing during the Second World War, and while
they destroyed roughly 70,000 enemy aircraft
on all fronts, they lost between 62,500 and
100,000 of their own machines in the process.81
Many of the losses were fighter aircraft and
fighter pilots, waging a hopeless battle of
attrition, the majority of them in defence of the
homeland. From the British camp, of the 8,655
Bomber Command aircraft that went down over
the Reich, Italy and Occupied Europe,
approximately 6,000 were attributable to air-to-
air combat during the bombing offensive.82
Nearly 1,80083 Luftwaffe night fighter aircrew, a
very small portion of the larger Luftwaffe fatal
casualty total, lost their lives during these
predominately nocturnal engagements.84
Provocation of an Axis Response
One of the most significant effects of thebombing was that it goaded Hitler into
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striking back in a wasteful and inefficient
retaliation campaign, embodied in the V-weapons
program. This massive industrial diversion
consumed the equivalent of 24,000 more fighter
aircraft for the Luftwaffe, and neither weapon
proved decisive. Also, the program squandered
the nation’s technical capacities, for it meant that
much more promising technologies, such as the
Me 262 jet fighter, the Type XXI and Type XXIII
U-boats, new acoustic torpedoes and the surface-
to-air Wasserfall missile had to be given much
less priority in terms of both intellectual and
material commitment.85 In the words of Albert
Speer, from the end of July 1943 onward, “our
tremendous industrial capacity was diverted to
the huge missile known as the V 2…the whole
notion was absurd.”86 Furthermore, the 1944
campaign against the V 1 launch sites, coupled
with the earlier and costly Bomber Command
raids on the rocket development centre at
Peenemünde on 17/18 August 1943, and in
October on the V 1 manufacturing site at Kassel,
effectively blunted the limited impact of these
weapons. Had they been available in quantity on
D-Day, the effects of the bombs raining down on
the embarkation ports and the massed invasion
fleet could have been catastrophic for the Allies.
The Me 262 could potentially have been a war-
winner for the Germans. However, it was slightly
delayed in its service debut by Hitler’s insistence
that it be produced as one of the retaliation
weapons, namely as a Blitz bomber, before it was
belatedly approved for production as a fighter
during the winter of 1944. More serious was the
delay, necessitated by the pursuit of other
priorities at least partially generated by the
bombings, in addressing the technological
shortcomings of the jet’s powerplants. Had the
aircraft been mass produced as a fighter even
six months earlier, its impact on Allied bomber
formations could have been cataclysmic. In
short, the bombing campaign generated
unforeseen technological responses conducted
at breakneck pace, and helped encourage the
German executive branch towards desperate
solutions forged by passionate aims of
retribution, versus cold, methodical, and logical
actions.
Some Sinister Threats Contained
Had Germany not been so diverted by thebombings and been free to mobilize its
manpower and technological resources in a total
war environment, chemical, biological and even
atomic weapons might well have been in store
for the Allies. And based on the Nazi track
The Germans expected their secret V-weapons to change the course of the war. Instead, attacks by Allied bombers
effectively blunted the potential impact of these weapons. Above left: This image from a captured German newsreel film
shows an early test launch of V2 rocket. Above right: This completely intact V1 Flying Bomb was captured by the
Americans in November 1944 after it made a “perfect” crash landing in France and did not explode. It was subsequently
dismantled and taken to the United States for study.
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record, although the use of these weapons was
certainly somewhat moderated by fear of
reprisals in kind, there is considerable evidence
to suggest that the German authorities had no
scruples about employing them in acts of
desperation, had they been widely available and
deliverable. The Germans were not particularly
focused on atomic weapons after the autumn of
1942, although their development remained a
continuous worry for the Allies. As to whether
Hitler would have had any moral reluctance to
use them, Albert Speer’s words are interesting:
“I am sure that Hitler would not have hesitated
for a moment to employ atom bombs against
England.”87 And how, in Speer’s opinion, did the
bombing affect the pursuit of a focused German
atomic program? “The increasing air raids had
long since created an armaments emergency in
Germany which ruled out any such ambitious
enterprise. At best, with extreme concentration
of all our resources, we could have had a German
bomb by 1947.”88 Specifically, the wholesale
evacuation of much of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute for Physics research facility ’s
infrastructure from the Dahlem suburb of Berlin
to Haigerloch in the Black Forest, in response
to intimidation generated by the Berlin air raids,
undoubtedly forced considerable delays and
confusion on the German atomic program and
disrupted its focus.89
Furthermore, the curtailment of the V 2
program in the spring of 1945 was perhaps a
more fortuitous event than is broadly realized
for the Allies. Specifications were already under
development for an advanced version of the
rocket known as the A 10, which used the V 2 as
a second stage booster, and it would have had a
trans-Atlantic reach. Had Germany been able to
put together an atomic weapon program to meld
with this delivery capability, the results could
have been cataclysmic. However, the bombings,
the persecution of significant Jewish scientific
talent, the widespread multiplicity of duplicating
research programs, all of which were competing
for Hitler’s favour instead of working together,
collectively conspired to stagnate German atomic
weapons development. The Germans had failed
to separate U 235, the essential fissile element,
on a large scale by August 1944, even though
A Canadian soldier looks into the crater caused by the impact of a V2 rocket. Fort de Merxim, Belgium, 15 October 1944.
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they had by then succeeded in manufacturing
uranium oxide, a core material for atomic
weapons. Still, in the view of the Alsos Team of
Allied atomic specialists that thoroughly
ransacked Germany, both before and after VE
Day, the Germans were years away from
producing an atomic weapon at the same time
the Allies were nearing successful completion of
their own.90
With respect to biological warfare, recent
research has determined that Germany was
ready to deploy a foot-and-mouth virus against
Britain during the final months of the war.
Successful tests were conducted over Russian
terrain against reindeer in 1943, but there was
no guarantee that lagging German bomber and
delivery system capabilities, hampered by the
concentration on fighter development
necessitated by the bombing, were able to
accurately dispense the material.91 The dispersal
of chemical agents faced similar constraints. The
deadliest nerve gas of the day, Tabun, was
manufactured in quantity at Dyhernfurth on the
Oder River late in the war. Considered ten times
more lethal than Phosgene, which was, until
then, rated the most lethal war gas, 15,000 tons
of Tabun were produced before the Soviets
overran the production facility in 1945. However,
all the finished products had been fitted into
different host munitions and removed from the
production facility prior to Soviet occupation.
At war’s end, nearly a half-million artillery shells
and more than 100,000 aircraft bombs filled with
Tabun were found in German arsenals, but they
became available too late to orchestrate a delivery
campaign, and they were subsequently destroyed
by the western Allies. Other German nerve gas
agents were called Sarin and Soman. Sarin, far
more lethal than Tabun, proved to be
exceptionally difficult to manufacture. Competing
priorities and technological problems associated
with its delivery delayed the emergence of Sarin,
although over 7,000 tons of it had been
stockpiled by the end of the war. However, had
the time, the will, and the wherewithal remained
to effectively field it, the Sarin stockpile would
have been enough to kill all the occupants of at
least 30 cities the size of Paris. Soman, an even
more potent agent, was never developed beyond
the laboratory.92
The Mining Campaign
Pays Huge Dividends
Other Bomber Command “diversions”contributed significantly to the war effort.
The mining campaign effectively denied the use
of the western Baltic to the Germans for transit
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and training and curtailed trade in the region.
Late in the war, the influence of Grossadmiral
Karl Dönitz on Hitler was significant, particularly
after Hermann Göring had fallen into disfavour.
Bomber Command had been very successful in
mining the shallow waters of the western Baltic,
which then made retention of the eastern Baltic
of paramount importance to the Kriegsmarine.
However, the eastern Baltic was more difficult
for bombers to reach and the deeper waters
made mines less effective. In order to retain sea
control of the region, Dönitz maintained that the
Germans needed to hold the Courland Pocket
in western Latvia, and also the Gulf of Danzig,
Memel, and East Prussia. Hitler agreed
completely with Dönitz’s assessment and
concurred that loss of the region would paralyze
the Kriegsmarine, particularly its U-boat
operations. In a late-war conference, however,
Generaloberst Heinz Guderian proposed that
the forces in Courland, Memel, and East Prussia
be evacuated in order to provide troops to
counter the impending Red Army spring
offensive. Nonetheless, based on the influence
of Dönitz, Hitler vetoed Guderian’s proposal, and
this effectively tied down 40 German divisions,
or a third of the forces available to fight the
approaching Red Army. Furthermore, these tied-
down forces contributed virtually nothing to the
final defence of the German homeland, and
protection of U-boat operations in the eastern
Baltic was also by then a moot point. In the words
of the Australian journalist and historian,
Chester Wilmot:
The history of the Second World War affords no
more striking example of the interplay of naval,
air and land power, or of the interrelation of the
Eastern and Western Front or, for that matter,
of the grotesque miscalculations and wild hopes
that governed Hitler’s strategy. Because the
German Air Force was unable to protect the
U-Boat bases and training waters in the western
Baltic, the German Army was obliged to hold
the eastern Baltic against the Russians so that
the German Navy might build up a new U-Boat
fleet capable of inflicting a severe defeat on the
Western Allies, and especially on the hated
British, whose refusal to capitulate in 1940 had
made inevitable that war on two fronts, which
had already destroyed most of Hitler’s empire
and was in the process of destroying the Third
Reich.93
No Respite for the U-boats
To demonstrate the direct effects of thebombing war against the Kriegsmarine,
Harris pointed out that Bomber Command
destroyed six German capital ships by either
bombing or mining, in comparison to only four
sunk during the entire war by the Royal Navy.
Furthermore, Bomber Command’s Official
History recorded that the Command, working
in conjunction with the American heavy bomber
fleet, destroyed at least 207 German submarines
during construction or in port after completion.94
At the end of 1943, Dönitz held forth the promise
of a reincarnated, invincible Kriegsmarine,
spearheaded by a fleet of formidable new U-
boats. These submarines, which incorporated
many technological improvements to enhance
survivability and combat effectiveness, were
scheduled for initial delivery in the autumn of
1944. Ultra-high-speed radio transmitters, more
sophisticated acoustic torpedoes, rubber coated
hulls to complicate radar detection, as well as
schnorkel underwater breathing devices and
significant augmentation of the onboard batteries
to allow the boats to remain submerged for
protracted periods of time, were just some of
the improvements incorporated into these
formidable new weapons. However, other
industrial diversions, brought on in no small
measure by the bombings, had delayed
production of the new boats. “First Brest, then
Lorient saw the start of a long series of bombing
raids which also greatly affected the civilian
population, and the Germans soon realized the
need to build shelters for personnel and
equipment. To effectively protect the submarines
themselves, it was necessary to produce solid
bunkers . . . The accelerated construction of the
U-boat pens at Hamburg was a direct result of
the bombing of the sheltered U-boat bases in
France.”95
Partially as a result of this enormous
diversion of economic effort, production of the
new variants was not given a high priority until
the spring of 1943, by which time the Battle of
the Atlantic was effectively lost. The blue-water
Type XXI and its much smaller coastal-operating
cousin, the Type XXIII, could perhaps have made
a difference had they been floated two years
earlier. They were capable of formidable
underwater ranges, and their performance
characteristics were outstanding. They promised
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much better prospects for attacking Allied
shipping and evading the escorts than did the
conventional U-boats. Both required only a
minimal daily time at schnorkel depth to keep
their batteries charged, thus making detection
extremely difficult. But the spectre of bombing
vulnerability had perpetuated a decision in the
summer of 1943 to build these submarines in
inland factories in modules,96 then transport
them to coastal facilities for rapid final assembly.
However, improper fitment between the modules
created production delays, and transportation
of the modules to the final assembly points was
also affected by the bombing.
The failure to achieve the objectives was mainly
caused by organization troubles, faulty design
and bad workmanship. It was particularly
annoying when sections did not fit to each other
because the specified tolerances were exceeded.
All these took place mainly in the first half of
1944 and it was fixed in the second half of the
year. At that time, however, the Allies realized
the danger and started regular bombing raids,
particularly on shipyards and water transport
installations needed for transportation of
massive Type XXI sections.97
Direct bombing delayed construction even
further, such that only two Type XXIs and six
Type XXIIIs were fully ready for combat by 1 May
1945, the date when 381 Type XXIs and 95 Type
XXIIIs had been planned for delivery.98 On top
of the construction delays, the constant mining
of the Baltic from the air inhibited the extensive
training required on the new boats, delaying still
further their introduction to service. Albert Speer
elaborates on the effects of the bombing: “We
would have been able to keep our promise of
delivering forty boats a month by early in 1945,
however badly the war was going otherwise, if
air raids had not destroyed a third of the
submarines at the dockyards.”99 For all the
aforementioned reasons, hardly any of the new
boats were operational at war’s end, although
their success in a few engagements trumpeted
great promise. It was once again a case of “too
little, too late.”100
Paving the Way for
Operation Overlord
The strategic bombing campaign madepossible a direct invasion of northwest
Europe in the summer of 1944. The lodgement
in Normandy was a direct result of the
generalized destruction of the German industrial
and economic war machine, particularly the
German Air Force, prior to the actual invasion.
The secondment of Bomber Command and the
Eighth Air Force from April until September
1944 to Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Forces under General Eisenhower
resulted in a significant depletion, destruction
and disorganization of the Luftwaffe, as well as
the enemy’s rail communications, prior to the
invasion. In its immediate wake, these
formations provided overwhelming direct tactical
support for the land campaign. Bomber
Command was particularly zealous in its pursuit
of rail targets, attacking over one hundred of
them prior to D-Day. Since much greater
accuracy was possible in 1944, by June, most
of the 37 rail centres assigned to Bomber
Command were either destroyed or heavily
damaged. These efforts, coupled with the
destruction of the Seine River bridges the week
prior to the invasion, made effective German
reinforcement virtually impossible. Air
superiority then secured the flanks of the
lodgement area after the landings, and
concomitant attacks on oil production facilities
further significantly handicapped both the
German Army and Air Force.
Along with attacking other major military
targets in France, Bomber Command dropped
some 14,000 tons of high explosives on the
Atlantic Wall fortifications during the prelude to
the landings, including 5,000 tons of explosives
on the defending beaches themselves.101 After the
ground forces were ashore, the Command
continued its attacks on rail and military targets,
including successful efforts against the ports of
le Havre, Boulogne, Brest, Calais, St. Malo, and
Cap Gris Nez. Most of France had been cleared
of the enemy when Eisenhower handed control
of Bomber Command back to the RAF on 16
September 1944. However, the Command
continued to support the land armies in a tactical
sense whenever called upon, including during
the late-war push into Germany. The words of
Joseph Goebbels bear testimony: “the enemy is
afraid of severe casualties but, as soon as he
meets resistance, he calls in his air force which
then simply turns the area of resistance into a
desert.”102
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The German Civilian
Tragedy in Perspective
Collateral civilian casualties within theGreater German Reich are estimated by
various sources to be approximately 410,000
civilian fatalities attributable to Allied bombing.
However, to this number one must add 23,000
non-military police and civilians attached to the
German armed forces, 32,000 foreigners and
prisoners of war, and 128,000 displaced
persons, which brings the total to approximately
593,000 persons. A further 60,000 Italians need
to be added to this total within the context of the
European Axis states. An additional 486,000
people were wounded or injured by the bombing
within the Greater German Reich alone. While
these are large numbers, they pale next to the
genocide perpetrated on the peoples of Europe
and Eurasia by the Germans and their allies. In
the bombing war, in comparison, Great Britain
lost roughly 65,000 civilians to aerial attack,
approximately 43,000 of which occurred during
the Blitz of 1940–41.103 Total wartime losses in
the German armed forces were approximately
3.8 million killed.104 In pursuit of the stated
Allied war aim of de-housing the civilian work
force, 3,370,000 dwellings in the Reich were
destroyed by the bombings, and 7,500,000
persons were made homeless.
The civilian loss of life from the bombing has,
in Richard Overy’s words, “occasioned the most
bitter recriminations of all against the bombing
strategy. It is something that Bomber Command
survivors take seriously and have thought about
deeply.” Overy argues that the British Executive
no longer felt obliged to act in restraint after the
German bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam
during the war’s opening stanzas, and that the
tens of thousands of British deaths during the
Blitz and the Baedeker Raids on British cities
other than London “made redundant any further
discussion about the rights and wrongs of
The city of Cologne in Germany was devastated during the Second World War, largely by aerial bombing, as seen in this
photo taken in 1945.
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bombing targets with the risk of civilian
casualty.”105 Those who see fit to challenge the
morality of the area bombing in particular should
bear in mind that a far greater travesty would
have been to allow the moral obscenity that was
the Third Reich to prevail unchecked by whatever
means were deemed necessary at the time.
Bombing conducted for the purpose of
lowering enemy morale was not practiced
exclusively by Bomber Command. We have
covered the American attitudes and policies on
area bombing, as practiced generally in
Operation Thunderclap and Operation Clarion,
and particularly at Dresden and Berlin. Major-
General Frederick L. Anderson Jr. was the
commanding general of the American Eighth
Bomber Command for most of the Combined
portion of the European air war. General
Anderson noted that while the isolated, late war
American bombing of mainly smaller urban
centres was not expected in itself to shorten the
war, “it is expected that the fact that Germany
was struck all over will be passed on, from father
to son, thence to grandson, (and) that a deterrent
for the initiation of future wars will definitely
result.”106 As the late-war evidence of Nazi
atrocities mounted, best exemplified by the
overrunning of the death camps and the
institutionalized murder committed therein,
there developed a significant Allied emotional
hardening reflected in the partial tactical use of
strategic bombers during the push through
Germany in the closing weeks of the war. If a
German urban area resisted and generated
Anglo-American casualties, it was normally
shelled and bombed into rubble. However, those
centres that acquiesced peacefully were normally
spared further destruction. For the most part,
similar courtesies were not extended during the
Soviet advance, and German citizens were quite
aware of the distinction.107 These actions
reinforced the point that no citizen of the Third
Reich was immune or exempt from the bombing,
and that further armed resistance was futile. This
deliberate demoralization of the enemy
undoubtedly helped shatter the German will to
resist, hastening the capitulation of German
forces in the western urban centres, and thereby
saving many lives, both Allied and Axis. In short,
those running the war in the Allied camp believed
that Nazism was an evil force let loose on the
world, and it needed to be eradicated as quickly
as possible and by whatever means necessary.
The circumstances which prevailed during the
war determined the bombing policy which was
to follow, and this writer feels it is only
appropriate to judge it in that context, rather
than through the application of latter-day social
and political values.
Allied Public Support
for the Bombing
Public opinion surveys from the war confirmwidespread Allied support for the
bombing.108 Neither politicians nor historians of
the period challenged the policy at the time, and
while British authorities staunchly maintained
that civilian casualties were nothing but “an
unfortunate by-product of attacks on industrial
areas, there is little reason to believe that the
general public would have complained had it
been otherwise.”109 Further, there was very little
questioning of the morality of the bombing
during the war, and what little that did occur
came primarily from isolated British religious
leaders. In the spring of 1941, the Bishop of
Chichester, George Bell, and Doctor Cosmo Lang,
The original caption of this US Air Force photo reads:
“Celestial Patterns – On their way to strike the heart of
Hitler’s domain. Berlin. Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of
the US 8th Air Force leave fleecy vapor trails as they roar
overhead.”
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the Archbishop of Canterbury, both felt that the
still-embryonic policy of bombing non-
combatants should not be allowed to prevail.
However, most British clerics supported the
bomber offensive through its various stages of
development. Dr. Cyril Garbett, the Archbishop
of York believed that “often in life there is no
clear choice between absolute right and wrong;
frequently the choice has to be made of the lesser
of two evils…and it is a lesser evil to bomb a
war-loving Germany than to sacrifice the lives of
thousands of our own fellow-countrymen…and
to delay delivering millions now held in
slavery.”110 Garbett then went on to argue
compellingly in favour of Allied use of air power
to bring the conflict to a swift, successful
conclusion. These views were published in The
Times on 25 June 1943, and they had the
unequivocal approval of Lambeth Palace, home
of the Archbishop of Canterbury.111 Indeed,
William Temple, who succeeded Cosmo Lang as
the Archbishop of Canterbury, echoed Garbett’s
stance in favour of the bomber offensive, as Lang
had also eventually done. Temple, reluctantly and
yet with total conviction, concurred that the
bombing was a necessary evil in a world far from
perfect. In December 1942, he wrote opponents
of the area bombing policy in part: “The worst
of all things is to fight and do it ineffectively.
Therefore, while I agree with you strategic
consideration cannot stand alone, [the bombing]
becomes very nearly decisive for our conduct.”112
Martin Middlebrook also offers the following
opinion: “A country fighting for its very existence
cannot afford to have strict boundaries of
morality in the means by which it saves itself. It
is sheer humbug to suggest that the use of
bombers at this time was wrong when it was
touch and go whether Britain survived at all.”113
 The Legality Issue
Even the German camp has longacknowledged that, moral issues aside, the
area bombing policy as it was conducted during
the Second World War was perfectly legal. During
the war, Eberhard Spetzler was a legal staff
officer in the Luftwaffe. Post-war, when he was
a professor of law at the University of Göttingen,
he opined that:
Since there are separate rules for land and sea
warfare and none was ever signed for aerial
warfare, the Rules for Land Warfare cannot be
applied to strategic bombing. Article 25 clearly
states that it is meant to protect civilians during
the physical conquest of their land. Bombers do
not occupy enemy territory, they only destroy it.
For a city to be protected by Article 25, it must
not have any defenses. Fighters attacking
bombers over their target must be considered
[to be] defending the city.114
 The area bombing of enemy cities has only
been illegal since August 1948, when the Red
Cross Convention on the Protection of Civilians
in Wartime was signed in Stockholm.115
The widespread damage resulting from the
fire raids on Rostock and Lübeck in March and
April of 1942 was candidly and appreciatively
reported to the British public at the time, and in
far-away Ottawa, similar sentiments were
recorded by none other than Prime Minister
Mackenzie King. He noted in his diary that the
Germans were the ones who had first embarked
on an indiscriminate bombing policy.116 While
B.K. Sandwell, the liberalist editor of Saturday
Night worried about the moral toll it would take
on the crews themselves, in the end, he had to
side with the policy:
The defeat of Germany can only be brought about
by killing Germans, and if the object of these
raids is to kill Germans…it is a perfectly proper
object. The blood of such innocent persons as
these is not on us…The whole German people
brought on themselves whatever calamities may
issue for them out of this war, when they put
themselves under the kind of government which
was bound to make such a war ultimately
inevitable. It is our unavoidable task to make
Germany suffer.117
Other national papers echoed Sandwell’s
opinions:
In its editorial of 31 May 1943, the Toronto
Telegram declared that, while bombing
undoubtedly meant “misery and death for the
people of the Axis nations…it is better that they
should be blotted out entirely than that the world
should be subjected to the rulers they have
tolerated so long, and there are many who hold
that they must be made to know in full the
horrors of war, if a new war is to be avoided.”
The Winnipeg Free Press, meanwhile, had
already belittled the few who demanded
limitations on bombing because they were asking
“air crews still more to endanger their own lives
so that they may perhaps save the lives of
workers in industrial war facilities or living in
the immediate neighbourhood of those
targets.”118
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From a participant’s standpoint, CAN/RAF
pilot Kenneth McDonald recalls the manner in
which he and his crew were received by factory
workers on a motivational visit following his
operational tour in 1943:
I can testify to the hatred war breeds. When we
finished our tour of operations in 1943, we were
sent as a crew on a morale raising round of
factories in London that were making Halifaxes.
My job was to describe a typical op and to
introduce the crew members. Each time I came
to Tim McCoy, the rear gunner, and told the
assembled workers that he could see the fires
from fifty miles away on the trip home they burst
into cheers. Those men and women had lived
through the London Blitz, had lost homes and
relatives, were still at risk from German bombs,
and felt I’m sure that here in front of them was
living proof not only that their work was
worthwhile but that there was hope for an end
to the war and their privations. They too had
lived through the thirties when Hitler and his
brownshirts took power, had witnessed on film
and in newspapers the transformation of a
country not unlike their own into an armed camp
that threatened its neighbours while bullying or
murdering any of its own citizens who dared to
protest or who were judged to be racially or
otherwise unpure.119
Area Bombing and the Japanese War
Not the least of the wartime contributions ofthe Allied bombing campaign in Europe was
that its success inspired a similar late-war
campaign against the industrial cities of the
Japanese home islands. The strategic area
bombing of Japan, conducted by the American
20th Air Force in 1944 and 1945, destroyed an
area thirty times greater in size than did the two
atomic weapon releases at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in August 1945. Ironically, when high-
level daylight bombing with high explosives
proved ineffective and costly early in the
campaign, the Americans borrowed a page from
Bomber Command by conducting a series of
night raids at relatively low level using
incendiaries. The success of this area bombing
was a result of the unfettered use of those
incendiary weapons against highly flammable
targets that deliberately created firestorms. In
reality the loss of 250,000 Japanese lives, the
wounding or injuring of a further 500,000 and
the destruction of 40 percent of the buildings in
66 industrialized cities had brought Japan to
the brink of surrender prior to the atomic bomb
drops on the 6th and 9th of August.120 And yet,
based on the fierce determination to resist an
Allied invasion of the home islands, exemplified
by the sacrifice of 2,530 Japanese Navy aircrew
members121 and at least as many Army aircrew122
on Kamikaze missions directed against Allied
shipping (the last of which took place on the day
of the cessation of hostilities, 15 August 1945),
the Allied Executive was greatly concerned about
the blood cost to both sides should an invasion
of the Japanese home islands prove necessary.
Winston Churchill elaborates:
We had contemplated the desperate resistance
of the Japanese fighting to the death with
Samurai devotion, not only in pitched battles,
but in every cave and dugout. I had in my mind
the spectacle of Okinawa Island, where many
thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender,
had drawn up in line and destroyed themselves
by hand grenades after their leaders had
solemnly performed the rite of hara-kiri. To quell
the Japanese resistance man by man and to
conquer the country yard by yard might well
require the loss of a million American lives and
half that number of British—or more if we could
get them there: for we were resolved to share
the agony.123
Indeed, the Japanese War Cabinet, the
military clique under the control of the Prime
Minister, General Hideki Tojo, was determined
to commit the Japanese people to mass suicide,
calling “for the sacrifice of up to 100,000,000
Japanese lives, if necessary, to repel the Allied
invasion of the home islands.”124 The area
bombing of Japan had certainly dealt a
debilitating blow to the Japanese war industries,
and the remaining factories were on the verge of
collapsing for want of component parts and
damage to infrastructure. And yet, in July 1945,
the Japanese aviation industry was still capable
of producing over 1,000 military aircraft per
month, and many hundreds of warplanes were
still available for home defence.125 There was also
no shortage of suicidally-inspired pilots available
and willing to substitute courage for
technological inadequacy and dive the aircraft
into a massed Allied invasion force. Furthermore,
“orders went out that every Japanese man
between the ages of 15 and 60 and all women
aged 17 to 40 would meet the invaders at beaches
with sharpened bamboo poles. Allied peace
feelers were rejected.”126
Although it was a painful decision for the
Allies, the two atomic drops, with the
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concomitant loss of an additional 150,000
Japanese citizens, combined with a rapidly
worsening war situation, largely precipitated by
the area bombing of the industrial cities,
convinced the Japanese that further resistance
was pointless. Defending against the massed
fleets of formidable, heavily-protected B-29
Superfortresses was difficult enough, but the
atomic drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
convinced them that they were powerless to
defend the entire nation from the high and fast-
flying, singly-penetrating B-29s that could bomb
anywhere in the nation. This underscored the
futility of further resistance and spared the
Japanese people from the obligation of being
killed to the last available fighting man and
woman. Therefore, strategic bombing
undoubtedly ultimately prevented many
casualties, both Allied and Japanese, by
eliminating the need for an armed invasion of
the Japanese mainland, the costs of which,
measured by any yardstick, would have been
horrific.
It is perhaps appropriate that the area
bombing policy’s most dedicated champion, Sir
Arthur Harris, should have the last word on the
moral justification of command policy. In one of
his most famous newsreel speeches of the war,
he reminded his audience that it was the Nazis
who had “sown the wind,” and that, in return,
they would “reap the whirlwind.”127
* * * * *
Bomber Command played an essential partas a guarantor of Allied victory during the
Second World War. It provided an offensive tool
that took the fight to the enemy when none other
was available, and it gave the citizens of the Allied
nations hope and pride while it did so. It
provided Britain and the Commonwealth,
through its very prosecution, a political
dimension by which it could influence the
conduct of the war. Its operations demanded a
significant diversion of German resources away
from the Eastern Front, thereby aiding the USSR
in its part of the combined struggle. The
Command struck substantial and unrelenting
blows against enemy morale. It threw Germany’s
broader war strategy into disarray, and generated
a loss of German air superiority, along with doing
much significant damage to the Reich’s war
industrial base. Its actions made the way safer
for an Allied re-entry into northwest Europe in
1944, and it effectively stymied German
economic mobilization and technological
development in many areas. While a great human
price was paid for these accomplishments on
both the combatant sides, in relative terms, the
losses incurred to the Anglo-Americans were
small when compared to those suffered
elsewhere, such as in the USSR. And the overall
cost was relatively low as a percentage of the
total war effort, considering the gains that were
realized.
Canada’s contribution to this campaign was
highly significant, and the nation should be
extremely grateful to those warriors of the night
who held firm and proud from the right of the
line in European skies so many years ago.
Although the air war was only a part of an
enormous conflict that swept over Europe, it did
prove decisive in helping the Allies achieve
victory, since it played an indispensable role,
without which the Anglo-American lodgement on
the continent and the final defeat of the Third
Reich was inconceivable.128
What bombing (in part) did—both area and
precision—was to act as a constant source of
attrition for most industrialists, interrupting
transport flows, hitting small component
factories, attacking gas, electricity and power
supplies. Many of these were not critical but the
important thing was their cumulative effect.129
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